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I Comments

I

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr and the Power
of Preemption: A Pennsylvania Guide

to the Preemption of Common Law
Tort Claims by the Medical Device

Amendments of 1976
"What breaks in me? Some sinew cracks! -'tis whole again
-Captain Ahab1

I.

Introduction

As the number of the elderly steadily increases in the United
States,2 so too does the need for an abundance of reliable, costefficient medical devices. Twenty years ago, Congress took a giant
step toward ensuring that those devices would be provided when it
passed the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 ("MDA") to the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.3 The MDA were passed in the

1. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 517 (Bantam Classic ed., Bantam Books 1981)
(1851).
2. According to the Census Bureau, the growth of the elderly will be steady until 2010;
then, during the period between 2010 and 2030, a "massive increase" in the number of the
elderly will occur when the Baby Boom generation reaches 65. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, P23-190, 65+ IN THE UNITED
STATES 2-5 (1996).

3. See H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 7-8 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-33, at 1 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1071.
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wake of growing concern for the safety of medical devices such as
the Dalkon Shield.4 Indeed, the preamble of the MDA states that
and effectiveness of
their purpose is "to provide for the safety
5

medical devices intended for human use.",

The MDA require manufacturers of certain types of medical
devices to obtain Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
approval prior to marketing and selling medical devices. 6 To
obtain approval from the FDA, manufacturers of these devices
must meet the requirements outlined in the FDA regulations.7
The MDA also contain a preemption provision, section

360k(a), that prevents states from placing requirements on medical
device manufacturers that are "different from" or "in addition to"
the regulations promulgated by the FDA. 8

For several years,

courts across the country, responding to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,9 have disagreed as to whether the requirements imposed on medical device
manufacturers by the MDA preempt state common law products
liability claims.'0 In recent years, Pennsylvania courts have held

4. The Dalkon Shield was an intrauterine contraceptive device that was introduced to
the American public in 1970. The Dalkon Shield was held out by its manufacturers to be
safe and effective, but its use resulted in a high percentage of inadvertent pregnancies and
several deaths. See H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 8.
5. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).
6. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (1994). See also discussion infra note 11.
7. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
8. The MDA preemption provision states:
§ 360k. State and local requirements respecting devices
(a) General Rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any requirement(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter
included under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
9. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). In Cipollone, the Court considered federal preemption of state
tort claims related to health warning labels on cigarette packages. See id. at 508. The Court
concluded that the federal statute regulating the labeling of cigarette packages was intended
to preempt any additional warning requirements. See id. at 517-20. Therefore, the Cipollone
Court held that certain failure to warn claims presented by the plaintiff were preempted. See
id. at 524.
10. See, e.g., Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding
that the MDA preempted all state tort claims against a penile implant manufacturer with the
possible exception of an "express warranty" claim); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431 (5th
Cir. 1995) (finding that the MDA preempted state tort "failure to warn" claims against a
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that the MDA preempt state tort claims with regard to devices that
the FDA has classified as Class III.tt
In January 1996, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,t2 the United
States Supreme Court addressed several areas of confusion among

the lower courts regarding MDA preemption of state tort claims.
In so doing, the Court reached two conclusions. First, the Medtronic Court refused to hold preempted claims stemming from a
defective Class III medical device, a pacemaker that had received
its FDA marketing approval through an abbreviated procedure
allowable under the MDA. t3
Second, the Medtronic Court
explained that the MDA will only preempt a state tort claim in
cases where the FDA has established "specific counterpart
regulations or ...other specific requirements applicable to the
specific device." 14

This comment considers the past and prospective future of the
MDA's preemption provision and the practical ramifications of the
Court's decision in Medtronic. Specifically, Part II of this comment
focuses on the medical device review procedures and the preemp-

penile implant manufacturer but not "design defect" claims); Anguiano v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., Inc., 44 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the MDA did not preempt
state tort claims against a manufacturer of teflon used in jaw implants because the FDA did
not provide specific requirements regarding teflon); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130
(1st Cir. 1993) (finding complete MDA preemption of state tort claims against a Class III
device manufacturer); Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 396 (D. Md. 1994) (finding that
the MDA preempted all state tort claims against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective
pacemaker); Elbert v. Howmedica, 841 F. Supp. 327 (D. Haw. 1993) (finding that the MDA
did not preempt state tort claims against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective
prosthetic knee); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding that the
MDA preempted state tort claims against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective heart
valve).
11. The MDA divide medical devices into Class I, Class II, and Class III devices. This
comment will only consider those devices classified as Class III devices by the FDA. Class
III medical devices are those that the FDA has determined either "present a potential
unreasonable risk of illness or injury," are "purported or represented to be for a use in
supporting or sustaining human life," or are "for a use which is of substantial importance in
preventing impairment of human health." 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
Class I and II devices may often be marketed without prior approval from the FDA,
and, therefore, do not present the same preemption problems as Class III devices. See 21
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A), (B).
For Pennsylvania cases dealing with MDA preemption in Class II medical device cases,
see Riley v. Becton Dickinson VascularAccess, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Oliver
v. Johnson & Johnson, 863 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Pa. 1994); Burgstahlerv. AcroMed Corp., 670
A.2d 658 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
12. 116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).
13. See id. at 2253-57.
14. Id. at 2257 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995) (FDA regulation)).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:4

tion provision of section 360k of the MDA. Part III considers the
trend of Pennsylvania courts following Cipollone, yet prior to
Medtronic. The United States Supreme Court's decision in
Medtronic is examined in Part IV. In Part V, the effects of the
Medtronic decision on Pennsylvania courts is discussed. Lastly, Part
VI considers the impact of post-Medtronic preemption limitations
on medical device manufacturers and recipients.
II.

MDA Overview

A. PremarketApproval
The MDA require medical device manufacturers to receive a
"premarket approval" ("PMA") from the FDA before placing any
new Class III medical device15 on the market. 16 The purpose of
the PMA requirement is to give the FDA a method of ensuring
that new Class III devices are both safe and effective.' 7
The MDA provide two means by which a Class III device may
receive a PMA. The first requires manufacturers to submit detailed
information concerning the safety and efficacy of new devices to
the FDA. i" This information then becomes the subject of an
FDA panel review, a public meeting, and an FDA advisory
committee report and recommendation. 9 The FDA spends an
° and the review
average of 1,200 hours on each submission,
21
days.
180
process takes a minimum of
The second method of receiving a PMA for a Class III medical
device is known as the "section 510(k) process," referring to its
section number within the MDA. The section 510(k) process
applies only to devices that are determined by the FDA to be
"substantially equivalent" to pre-MDA devices for which the FDA
has not yet completed its PMA review. 22 Section 510(k) allows
15. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(c).
20. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong. 384 (1987).
21. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.44.
22. The Medtronic Court explained:
Congress realized that existing medical devices could not be withdrawn from the
market while the FDA completed its PMA analysis for those devices. The [MDA]
therefore includes a "grandfathering" provision which allows pre-1976 devices to
remain on the market without FDA approval until such time as the FDA initiates
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"substantially equivalent" devices to receive FDA approval through
a simplified process. 3 To get approval for a device under the
section 510(k) process, a device manufacturer must submit a section
510(k) notification to the FDA.24 Once the FDA has accepted a
device as "substantially equivalent" to an authorized device, the
device can be marketed without further regulatory analysis from
the FDA?8
There are dramatic advantages for manufacturers who are able
to receive a PMA for devices through the section 510(k) process.
For instance, the FDA spends an average of only twenty hours
reviewing each section 510(k) notification it receives, whereas it
generally spends 1,200 hours reviewing each standard PMA
application under the MDA.26 One legal commentator explained:
"[T]he attraction of substantial equivalence to manufacturers is
clear. A [section] 510(k) notification requires [the submission of]
little information, rarely elicits a negative response from the FDA,
and gets processed very quickly."'27
On the other hand, the section 510(k) process is not nearly as
attractive for consumers of medical devices. While section 510(k)
authorization may help keep retail prices for some medical devices
down because manufacturers do not incur the expenses associated
with fulfilling the standard PMA requirements, section 510(k)approved devices are not subject to any sort of safety or efficacy
review by the FDA. Therefore, recipients of section 510(k)approved devices do not enjoy any protection from the MDA
regarding the safety or efficacy of their devices. If the pre-MDA
device is dangerous or ineffective, the MDA provide no assurance
that a later device will not also be dangerous or ineffective. 2

and completes the PMA.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1996) (summarizing in part 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e(b)(1)(A)).
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B).
24. See id. § 510(k).
25. See id.

26. See id.
27. Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction
Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511, 516 (1988).
28. See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON MEDICAL
DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA'S NEGLECTED CHILD 35 (Comm. Print 98-F 1983).
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B. MDA Preemption Provision
Also included within the MDA is a specific preemption
provision, section 360k.29 Section 360k has led to questions
regarding the degree to which states are able to accommodate
common law claims based on medical device defects. In 1991, the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.3 ° presented further uncertainties regarding federal
regulatory preemption provisions and state common law tort claims.
The Cipollone decision resulted in numerous federal and state
courts holding that most common law products liability claims
against medical device manufacturers were strictly preempted by
section 360k of the MDA.31
III. MDA Preemption of Common Law Tort Claims in Pennsylvania Prior to Medtronic
Pennsylvania courts have generally recognized products
liability claims arising from manufacturing, designing, and warning
defects.32 Pennsylvania courts recognize claims against these
defects under both strict liability33 and negligence theories.34
Following Cipollone, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in
Green v. Dolsky,35 addressed the issue of whether section 360k of
the MDA preempts common law products liability claims against
device manufacturers of products receiving premarket approval
through the standard PMA process. The Green court concluded
that a finding in favor of the Greens on any of their alleged state
tort claims would impose "additional or different requirements on
[the manufacturer], whose product.., has already received FDA
approval.,36 The court further held that "[s]uch requirements are

29. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text (statutory
language).
30. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
31. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
32. See Kenepp v. American Edwards Lab., 859 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
33. Pennsylvania courts have adopted section 402a of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1977). See Phillips v. A-Best Prods. Co., 665 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1995).
34. See Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991).
35. 641 A.2d 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
36. Id. at 605.
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in conflict with the MDA
and thus, the Greens' state law claims are
37
therefore preempted.,
Federal courts in Pennsylvania further expanded the preemptive power of section 360k by preempting most state tort claims
against manufacturers of products that received premarket approval
38
through the section 510(k) "substantial equivalence" process.
This expansion of preemptive power had the effect of providing
medical device manufacturers with a protective shield against
liability for defective devices even when FDA review of the devices
had been cursory. Ironically, the MDA, whose stated purpose is to
protect medical device consumers, had become the means of
insulating manufacturers against the claims of consumers in
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania courts were not alone in limiting the
liabilities of medical device manufacturers through the adoption of
an expansive view of section 360k.39
IV. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
A. Background
In 1987, Lora Lohr was implanted with a pacemaker equipped
with a lead that had received its PMA through the section 510(k)
process.'
On December 30, 1990, Lohr's pacemaker failed.4"
Lohr underwent emergency surgery in order to clear a "complete
heart blockage" that was allegedly caused by the pacemaker's
failure. 42 According to Lohr's doctor, her heart blockage was
likely caused by a defect in the pacemaker's lead.43

37. Id.
38. See English v. Mentor, 67 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding all claims preempted
except breach of express warranty); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995)
(finding all claims preempted except breach of express warranty and fraudulent promotion);
In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL1014, 1996 WL 221784, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 1996) (finding all claims preempted except breach of express warranty and
fraudulent promotion).
39. In a company press release following the Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic,
representatives of Medtronic, Inc. "expressed surprise that the Supreme Court had reversed
the trend in which the overwhelming majority of lower courts had limited product liability
claims for devices that had been cleared for marketing by federal regulatory action." James
Cahoy, U.S. Supreme Court:Medical Device Patients Can Sue in State Courts, WEST'S LEGAL
NEWS, June 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6272.
40. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2248 (1996).
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See id.
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In 1993, Lohr filed suit in Florida state court asserting both

strict liability and negligence claims against Medtronic, Inc., the
manufacturer of the lead." The negligence claim alleged that
Medtronic had breached its duty of reasonable care in designing,
manufacturing, assembling, and selling the pacemaker.45 The
claim alleged in part that Medtronic had used defective materials
in the lead and had also failed to warn Lohr or her physician of the
tendency of the pacemaker to fail despite knowledge of other
previous failures.'
The strict liability claim alleged that the

device was "in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous
to foreseeable users at the time of its sale."4 7
Medtronic removed the case to federal district court and filed
a motion for summary judgment." The district court, following

a recent Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision,49 granted
the motion and dismissed Lohr's claims. On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.50
The court allowed Lohr's claims based on defective design, but held
that Lohr's negligent manufacturing and failure to warn claims
were preempted by the MDA.51 Subsequently, Medtronic filed a
petition for certiorari seeking the dismissal of the defective design
claims.52 Lohr filed a cross-petition seeking allowance of the
defective manufacture and failure to warn claims.5 3 The Supreme
54
Court granted both petitions.

44. See id.
45. See Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2248.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 2248.
49. Id. at 2249. The district court had initially dismissed Medtronic's motion for
summary judgment, but after the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Duncan v.
lolab, Corp., 12 F.3d 194 (11th Cir. 1994), the district court reviewed its previous decision
and dismissed the complaint. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2249.
50. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 56 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1995).
51. See id. at 1347-49, 1351-52. The court of appeals held that the Lohrs' manufacturing
claims were preempted by the "good manufacturing practices" requirements of the FDA that
establish general guidelines for most steps in every medical device's manufacturing process.
See id. at 1350. See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.20-.198 (1995) (FDA regulations establishing
manufacturing requirements). The court of appeals held that Lohr's failure to warn claims
were preempted by the labeling regulations of the FDA. See Medtronic, 56 F.3d at 1350-51.
See also 21 C.F.R. § 801.109 (FDA regulations establishing labeling requirements).
52. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250.
53. See id.
54. See id.
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United States Supreme Court's Decision in Medtronic

Although the Justices of the Supreme Court were not able to
agree on all the issues presented in Medtronic, the Court was able
to give significant direction regarding the preemptive powers of the
MDA. The decision of the Supreme Court consisted of three
opinions. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Kennedy,
and Souter, wrote the plurality opinion.5
Justice O'Connor,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas,
wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 6
Justice Breyer wrote separately concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment. 7
1. 510(k)-approved devices.-The Court found that design
defect claims against section 510(k)-approved medical devices are
not preempted by section 360k of the MDA.5 In arriving at this
conclusion, Justice Stevens, writing for a majority on this point,
held that "[t]here is no suggestion in either the statutory scheme or
the legislative history that the section 510(k) exemption process was
intended to do anything other than maintain the status quo with
respect to the marketing of existing medical devices and their
substantial equivalents."59 Stevens added that the "status quo
included the possibility that the manufacturer.., would have to
defend itself against state-law claims . ..."'
Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Stevens that design
defect claims for products receiving approval by means of section
510(k) are not preempted "[b]ecause the section 510(k) process ... places no 'requirements' on a device . "...,,61
Regardless
of the precise reasoning, however, the majority agreed that
defective design claims rooted in devices that have received their
FDA approval through section 510(k) are not preempted by the
MDA.

55. See id. at 2245.
56. See id. at 2262.
57. See Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2259.
58. See id. at 2254-55, 2264.
59. Id. at 2254-55. Justice Stevens further explained that section 510(k) was intended
to give manufacturers the "freedom to compete, to a limited degree," with manufacturers of
devices existing before 1976. Id. at 2254.
60. Id. at 2255.
61. Id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Claims specifically alleging violation of FDA require-

ments.-Majority support was also garnered for the idea that
manufacturing and labeling claims specifically alleging the violation

of FDA requirements are not preempted.62 Justice Stevens relied
on FDA regulations6 3 in determining that the court of appeals
should not have preempted Lohr's manufacturing and warning

claims "to the extent that they rest on claims that Medtronic
negligently failed to comply with duties 'equal to, or substantially
64
identical to, requirements imposed' under federal law."

Again, Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Stevens' conclusion that claims specifically alleging the violation of FDA require-

ments are not preempted.65

Justice O'Connor explained that

"[w]here a state cause of action seeks to enforce [a Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act] requirement, that claim does not impose a

requirement that is 'different from, or in addition to' requirements
under federal law. ', 66 Therefore, majority support existed for the

proposition that manufacturing and warning claims that specifically
allege the violation of FDA requirements are not precluded.
3.

Specificity requirement.-A third conclusion of the Court

relates to the question of which claims constitute the imposition of
requirements "different from, or in addition to" FDA requirements. 67 Justice Stevens held that in order for a claim to be
preempted under section 360k, the potentially preemptive FDA
requirements must "be 'applicable to the device' in question" and
must either constitute "specific counterpart regulations" or be
"'specific' to a 'particular device. ' ' ' 68

62. See Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2257.
63. The Court specifically looked to 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(2) (1995), which states that
section 360k "does not preempt State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially
identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act." Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2256.
64. Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2240.
65. See id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. Justice O'Connor concluded that "§ 360k does not preclude States from
imposing different or additional remedies, but only different or additional requirements." Id.
67. Id. at 2255-56.
68. Id. at 2257. This portion of Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Justice Breyer,
but, while Justice Stevens believed that the specificity requirement would result in "few"
cases of MDA preemption, Justice Breyer was not "convinced" that this would be the case.
See id. at 2262 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Justice O'Connor took a broader view of the preemptive
capabilities of section 360k.69 Justice O'Connor discarded Justice
Stevens' requirement of constituting "specific counterpart regulations" and argued that state law claims should be preempted if they
will "impose 'any requirement' 'which is different from or in
addition to,' any requirement applicable to the device under the
[MDA]." 7 Justice O'Connor concluded that FDA manufacturing
and labeling requirements did exist with respect to Lohr's pacemaker, and, therefore, any state common law claims constituted
"additional requirements.",7 ' Thus, according to Justice O'Connor,
Lohr's defective manufacture and labeling claims should have been
preempted. 2
Ultimately, however, Justice Stevens' plurality opinion
requiring either "specific counterpart regulations" or regulations
relating to the "particular device" was controlling in deciding the
outcome of Medtronic. Additionally, with the primarily concurring
opinion of Justice Breyer, Justice Stevens' opinion regarding what
constitutes an "additional requirement" for purposes of 360k
preemption appears to have precedential value.
In summary, the Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic
provides guidance regarding the treatment of medical device
products liability claims in three ways. First, state common law
design defect claims arising from section 510(k)-approved medical
devices are not preempted by section 360k of the MDA.73
Second, manufacturing and warning claims alleging violation of
FDA requirements are not preempted by section 360k. 74 Third,
section 360k of the MDA only preempts state tort claims when a
claim has the effect of constituting a "specific counterpart regulation" for a device, or is "particular" to a device in question.7 5
Medtronic does not provide instruction regarding questions of what
actually constitutes "specific counterpart regulations" however, nor
does the Court agree as to the likely frequency of such occurrences.

69. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 2264.
See id. at 2253-55.
See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2256.
Id. at 2257.
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V. Post-Medtronic State of Medical Device Products Liability
Preemption in Pennsylvania
The decision of the Supreme Court in Medtronic has changed
the face of MDA preemption for Pennsylvania courts in several
ways. First, the trend among Pennsylvania federal courts preempting common law tort claims against products approved through the
section 510(k) "substantial equivalence" test has been discontinued.76 Second, Pennsylvania courts may not find as preempted
manufacturing and warning claims that specifically allege violation
of FDA requirements.77 Additionally, Pennsylvania courts must
allow all common law tort claims that are not both (1) "'applicable
to the device' in question" and (2) either constitute "specific
counterpart regulations" or are "'specific' to a 'particular device."78
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Green v.
Dolsky79 provides a good example of the effects of Medtronic on
preemption in Pennsylvania when compared with the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania's pre-Medtronic resolution of the same
case.' Green involved a plaintiff who was alleged to have developed an autoimmune disorder after receiving an injection of
Zyderm Collagent Implant ("Zyderm") from her physician.81
Zyderm is a Class III medical device under the MDA that received
its approval from the FDA through the standard PMA process.82
Green brought numerous claims against the manufacturer of
Zyderm; all of which were found by the superior court to be
preempted by section 360k.83
While the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's post-Medtronic
consideration of Green's claims resulted in a finding that some of
the claims constituted specific counterpart regulations and were,

76. See English v. Mentor, 67 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL1014, 1996 WL 221784, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 1996).
77. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
79. 685 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1996).
80. See Green v. Dolsky, 641 A.2d 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
81. See Green, 685 A.2d at 113.
82. See id.
83. See Green, 641 A.2d at 605-07. The claims were based on theories of negligence,
strict liability, breach of warranty, and fraud in obtaining FDA approval to market Zyderm.
See id. at 601.
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consequently, preempted by section 360k, 8 the court found that
several of Green's claims were not preempted by section 360k
because they, "in essence, mirror[ed] FDA requirements ....
While Green provides an example of the application of the
"specific counterpart regulations" preemption test in Pennsylvania,
it is possible that the courts of other states will differ on their
handling of the matter. This may result in forcing both device
manufacturers and recipients to cater to a broad range of liability

patterns.
Medtronic has also had an impact on the subject matter
jurisdiction of federal courts within Pennsylvania. This impact was
recognized in August 1996 by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Falcone v. Baxter.'6 In
Falcone, the court remanded a medical devices suit to Pennsylvania
state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Falcone
court came to the conclusion that a majority of the Medtronic
Court, through the opinions of Justices Stevens and Breyer, agreed
that "Congress had never intended the MDA to preempt ... garden-variety tort claims ... , at least in the absence of

84. See Green, 685 A.2d at 117. The claims that the court found preempted by section
360k were: negligent development of the product; failing to warn plaintiff; failing to give
adequate warning to physicians; failing to properly label the product; and Green's strict
liability claim. See id at 117-18. With respect to the failure to warn claims, the court noted
that the FDA had specifically approved the labeling and package inserts including the
Physician Package Insert. See id. at 117, nn.5-6.
85. Id. at 117-18. The claims found not preempted by the court were: negligent distribution of Zyderm in commerce knowing Zyderm to be defective and dangerous; allowing
Zyderm to be sold in the face of known consequences; failing to test adequately in the face
of known consequences; failing to provide the FDA with all data; failing to provide the FDA
with known product risks and reactions; failing to adequately study adverse reaction in the
face of known consequences; allowing Zyderm to be sold while knowing of dangerous
propensities providing the FDA with false fraudulent and incomplete testing results; providing the FDA with false, fraudulent, and incomplete adverse reaction or injury information;
failing to withdraw Zyderm from the market under the circumstances; and failing to properly
monitor and identify patients who had been injected with Zyderm after learning of the
adverse consequences, to the extent that post-approval studies were required of Collagen by
the FDA. See id.
The Green court also found that Green's claims of "being negligent as a matter of law;
being otherwise negligent, careless, or reckless; and violating the statutes, laws or regulations
of the United States and Pennsylvania" were too general for the court to make a proper
preemption determination. Id. at 117.
86. No. Civ.A.96-2943, 1996 WL 482981, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 1993). See also
Headen v. Mentor, No. Civ.A.96-1459, 1997 WL 27104, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 1997)
(remanding a medical device products liability action to Pennsylvania state court for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction).
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a specific indication from the Food and Drug Administration to the
contrary."87 And, as a result, the Falcone court found that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
VI. Effects of Medtronic's Preemption Limitations on Consumers, Manufacturers, and Providers
A.

Effects on Consumers

The Medtronic decision affects medical device consumers in
several ways. First, the limitation of manufacturers' ability to use
MDA preemption provides incentive for manufacturers to produce
safer products. Second, the products liability suits allowed as a
result of the Medtronic decision will serve to spread the costs of
injuries resulting from defective medical devices among device
consumers. Of course, it must be noted that a spreading of costs,
by its own terms, promises to result in an increase in the retail costs
of medical devices. Third, Medtronic serves to reopen an avenue
of relief for injured device recipients that has not been available for
many recipients in recent years.
1. Preemptionlimitationprovides manufacturerswith incentive
to produce saferproducts.-Withrespect to section 510(k)-approved
devices, the enhanced potential liability resulting from Medtronic
presents device manufacturers with the choice of either designing
and manufacturing safer products or compensating injured
plaintiffs.8 8 Because liability often outweighs costs saved by
manufacturers in producing inferior products, manufacturers are
economically encouraged to design and manufacture safer products.

89

With respect to devices receiving FDA approval through the
standard PMA process, Medtronic provides extra incentive for

87. Falcone, 1996 WL 482981, at *2.
88. See William R. Hadley, StrictLiability-The Medical Malpractice CitadelStill Stands,
11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1357, 1360 (1978); Laura K. Jortberg, Who Should Bear the Burden
of Experimental Medical Device Testing: The Preemptive Scope of the Medical Device
Amendments Under Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 963, 982 (1994).
89. M. Kristen Rand, counsel on behalf of Consumers Union, explained to the Senate
Government Affairs Committee that "[c]ivil liability for manufacturing and marketing
dangerously defective medical devices provides an irreplaceable incentive in making medical
devices safer and in ensuring that consumers who are injured by defective devices are
compensated." Statement Before Senate Comm. on Regulation and Governmental Affairs,
103d Cong. (1994), available in 1994 WL 233511.
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device manufacturers to strictly comply with and document all
phases of the PMA process for new devices. The additional
pressure of civil litigation will help ensure that FDA regulations
and procedures will be followed, thereby enabling future device
recipients to be more confident of the quality of new devices.
2. Spread the costs of defective medical devices.-A second
reason that the Medtronic decision is important to medical device
consumers is that enhanced potential liability will help spread the
costs of defective medical devices among device consumers.9"
When manufacturers are held liable for injuries caused by defective
devices, the resulting costs are eventually incorporated into the
prices of their products and are thereby passed on to other medical
device consumers.9 The passing on of litigation costs to subsequent consumers is justified by the fact that subsequent consumers
are the recipients of safer devices.92 Additionally, device consumers, as potential recipients of defective devices, have an interest in
allowing manufacturer liability for defective devices.9'
3. Reopens an avenue of relief for victims of defective
devices.-Another reason Medtronicis important for medical device
recipients is because, in Medtronic, the Court reopened an avenue
of relief for device recipients. The Medtronic Court recognized that
the FDA premarket approval requirements, particularly those
outlined by section 510(k), were not sufficient to protect device
consumers from falling victim to defective devices. In so doing, the
Court also helped quell the shock waves attributable to its prior
decision in Cipollone94 that had the effect of denying recovery for
95
victims of medical device defects.
90. See Jortberg, supra note 88, at 983.
91. See generally William C. Powers, Jr., DistinguishingBetween Products and Services
in Strict Liability, 62 N.C. L. REV. 415, 423-28 (1984).
92. Jortberg explains that "[lioss spreading is justified in part by the fact that future
consumers benefit from information gathered during the period prior to their own use of the
product." Jortberg, supra note 88, at 983.
93. In his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal.
1944), Judge Roger Traynor explained, regarding the seriousness of being the victim of a
defective product: "The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can
be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business." Id. at 441.
94. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
95. It should be noted that the effect of denying preemption for medical products
liability suits, especially those against manufacturers of products approved through the sec-
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Following are several examples that illustrate the inherent

problems resulting from a broad application of MDA preemption
to Class III medical devices. Some of the following examples also
demonstrate how the Supreme Court's ruling in Medtronic has
resulted in eventual relief for some victims and their families.
a.

Mini-Profile catheter.-The "Mini-Proffle" heart catheter

was a product designed and manufactured by C.R. Bard, Inc.96 for
use in angioplasty procedures.' The catheter consisted of a four
and a half foot long tube about one eighth of an inch thick with a

tiny balloon at one end.98

Angioplasty procedures consist of

inserting the tube, with the balloon deflated, through an opening in

a vein in the arm or groin and threading the tube through the body
to the arteries near the heart.99 Once the balloon is in position,
it is temporarily inflated to compact any plaque building up within
the artery."
The balloon is then deflated, and the tube is
removed from the patient's body.1 1
No later than February 1988, executives at C.R. Bard became
aware that the Mini-Profile catheter did not always deflate
properly."° C.R. Bard executives were also aware that failure to
deflate could cause death.1" 3 Regardless of such information,

tion 510(k) process, has the potential to greatly impact the number of actionable claims in
the field of medical devices products liability. Since the enactment of the MDA in 1976, section 510(k) notification has become the dominant means of receiving FDA premarket approval. In 1990, it was reported that section 510(k) notifications accounted for 99 percent
of new Class III devices entering the market, and 80 percent of all medical device submissions (includes Class I and Class II medical devices). See H.R. REP. No. 101-808, at 14
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6307 (testimony of FDA Commissioner David A.
Kessler before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, Apr. 6, 1995). These
statistics suggest that even though the decision in Medtronic may not have a major impact
on states which, prior to Medtronic, did not recognize preemption for section 510(k)approved devices, states previously holding otherwise, such as Pennsylvania, may be
dramatically impacted.
96. Around 400,000 angioplasties are performed each year, making angioplasty a $900
million industry. Between 1980 and 1985, C.R. Bard held a virtual monopoly on the
production of angioplasty catheters, but by 1988 its share of the market was cut in half. See
Mitchell Zuckoff & John H. Kennedy, Heart Catheter Became Killer: Mass.-Made Unit
Blamed in Fraud,BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1993, at 1.
97. See Brief Amici Curiae of American Association of Retired Persons at 10,
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886).
98. See Zuckoff & Kennedy, supra note 96, at 1.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Zuckoff & Kennedy, supra note 96, at 1.
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C.R. Bard filed an inaccurate statement in support of its application
with the FDA pursuant to the section 510(k) premarket approval
process. 4 In May 1988, the FDA granted approval of the MiniProfile catheter.1" 5 Between July and November of that year,
C.R. Bard received at least twenty-eight complaints from doctors
and others about the catheter's failure to deflate.1 6 C.R. Bard
continued to ship the catheter while secretly making modifications
in an attempt to rectify the problem.10 7
In November 1988, Eunice Beavers suffered a mild heart
attack.'
Beavers' cardiologist recommended a balloon angioplasty in order to clear out any blockages that were impeding blood
flow to her heart."0 9 Beavers' daughters recalled being assured
that the odds against a problem were "1,000 to 1.''1 ° On December 28, 1988, Eunice Beavers died.'
Beavers' cardiologist, Dr.
John Cox, explained that after inserting the catheter into the
clogged coronary artery and inflating the balloon, "the device did
not deflate as it was supposed to.' ' 1

2

Beavers died shortly

thereafter.
Eventually, the FDA was informed of C.R. Bard's misconduct
from one of C.R. Bard's competitors and began to investigate the
competitor's allegations." 3 The investigation resulted in C.R.
Bard pleading guilty to 391 counts of conspiracy, mail fraud, lying
to regulators, and shipping "adulterated products" for human
experimentation." 4 Accordingly, C.R. Bard was fined sixty one

104. See id.
105. See Brief Amici Curiae of American Association of Retired Persons at 10,
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886).
106. See id.
107. See id. According to FDA Commissioner David Kessler, C.R. Bard was essentially
"using unsuspecting patients as guinea pigs and operating rooms as laboratories for
unapproved products." Zuckoff & Kennedy, supra note 96, at 2.
108. See Zuckoff & Kennedy, supra note 96, at 1.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. See Brief Amici Curiae of American Association of Retired Persons at 10,
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886).
114. See Zuckoff & Kennedy, supra note 96, at 1. The charges alleged that C.R. Bard
had also hidden from the FDA knowledge that the tip of a separate catheter, called the B
Probe, tended to break off inside patients. See id. Fifty patients actually had the tip break
off inside them during surgery causing, in some cases, excruciating prolonged pain and
permanent disablement. See Brief Amici Curiae of American Association of Retired Persons
at 10, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754, 95-886).
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million dollars. 115 Further, three individual C.R. Bard executives
were each sentenced to eighteen months in prison for making false
statements to the FDA concerning the reliability of the heart
116
catheters.
When the Beavers family, along with other victims of the
defective catheters, sought restitution in the criminal proceedings
against C.R. Bard in April 1994, they were informed by United
States District Judge Mark L. Wolf that civil suits were a more
appropriate means of redressing injuries because pain and suffering
and punitive damages might be available." 7
Ironically, four
months later, Judge Wolf dismissed the Beavers' civil suit holding
that their claims were preempted by section 360k of the MDA." 8
Judge Wolf's decision was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of
Appeals; the Beavers family filed a petition for certiorari on
February 16, 1996.119
The Beavers family and C.R. Bard eventually reached a
confidential out-of-court settlement in the same month that the
Supreme Court decided Medtronic.12 ° It appears likely that the
Medtronic decision was the catalyst for the eventual compensation
of the family of Eunice Beavers.
b. Bjork-Shiley heartvalve.-A second example of the insufficiency of the FDA regulations imposed pursuant to the MDA in
protecting medical device consumers involves the Bjork-Shiley
heart valve. The Bjork-Shiley heart valve is a mechanical heart
valve that is used to replace diseased or deformed valves. It
received its FDA approval under the section 510(k) process in
April 1979 despite the fact that during clinical trials one of the
valves had fractured.'' In fact, the FDA's Los Angeles District

115. See id.
116. See Jennifer B. Lee, Ex-Bard Executives Sentenced: Three Given 18 Months in Heart
Catheter Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 1996, at 1.
117. See United States v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287, 292-93 (D. Mass. 1994).
118. See Talbot v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 45 (D. Mass. 1994).
119. See Talbot v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for cert.filed, (U.S.
Feb. 6, 1996) (No. 95-1321).
120. See Lee, supra note 116, at 1.
121. See Brief Amici Curiae of American Association of Retired Persons at 21,
Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886); HOUSE COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 103D CONG.,
1ST SESS., A REPORT: LESS THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS: REFORMS NEEDED IN THE
ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND RESOURCES OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH 22 (Comm. Print 103-N
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Office warned the FDA Headquarters in that same year about the
"frequency of catastrophic failures" with the heart valve. 122 No
action was taken by the 1FDA
in response to the Los Angeles
23
District Office's warnings.
In January 1984, the FDA, despite confirmation of seventythree fractures causing fifty-eight deaths, decided not to recall the
heart valves at that time, but, instead, requested additional data
regarding the therapeutic value of the valve. 124 Interestingly, the
additional data was not even requested for purposes of evaluating
the safety of the valve. 125 FDA officials later explained that the
agency did not recall the valve pursuant to its apparent authority
under the MDA because the MDA procedure was "so lengthy
and
1 26
difficult to sustain in court that it [had] never been used.'
In the fall of 1985, after the FDA was made aware that a
major television network had planned to air a segment on the heart
valve issue, the FDA scheduled a panel hearing to evaluate the
safety of the Bjork-Shiley heart valve.'27 In 1986, prior to the
panel hearing, Shiley removed the valve from the market. 2 ' By
the time Shiley removed the valve from the market, approximately
forty thousand patients had received the valves.129 At that time,
there were at least 186 reported heart valve fractures. 3 ° By the
end of January 1993, the total number of fractures Shiley valves
had reached 501.'31
Prior to Cipollone in 1992, civil litigation provided a source of
compensation for some victims including those benefitting from a
class action settlement against Shiley, Inc. and its corporate parent,
Pfizer, Inc. 132 However, since Cipollone, Shiley has successfully

1993) [hereinafter LESS THAN THE SUM].
122. LESS THAN THE SUM, supra note 121, at 22.

123. See id.
124. See id. at 22, 28.

125. See id. at 22.
126. Id. at 5.
127. See LESS THAN THE SUM, supra note 121, at 5.
128. See id.
129. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., THE BJORK-SHILEY HEART VALVE:
"EARN AS YOU LEARN"; SHILEY INC.'S BREACH OF THE HONOR SYSTEM AND FDA's
FAILURE IN MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION 2 (Comm. Print 101-R 1990).

130. See LESS THAN THE SUM, supra note 121, at 22.
131. See id. at 32.
132. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
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asserted that claims regarding33manufacturing and warning defects
are preempted by the MDA1

c. Vitek jaw implant.-The Vitek Jaw Implant further
illustrates the insufficiency of the section 510(k) process as a means
of insuring quality medical devices. In the 1960s, the Dow Corning
Corporation began marketing a silicone jaw implant for patients
suffering from temporomandibular joint disorder ("TMJ"), a
painful condition that can result in muscle spasms, misaligned teeth,
arthritis, and other injury.134 Between five hundred thousand to
one million Americans seek treatment for TMJ each year. Eighty
to ninety percent of those seeking treatment are women.135
In 1983, the FDA approved, through the section 510(k)
substantial equivalency process, a Teflon jaw implant manufactured
by Vitek. 136 The jaw implant was manufactured using a specific
type of Teflon, called Proplast, that had never been tested in either
animals or humans prior to its release on the market. 37 Shortly
after the jaw implant became available on the market, evidence
began to suggest that the devices were susceptible to fragmentation
138
causing debilitating pain and permanent skull deterioration.
Between 1983
and 1990 over 26,000 patients had received the
9
implants.

13

Interestingly, civil litigation caused Vitek to withdraw its jaw
implant in 1988, two years prior to the issuance of an FDA safety
alert. 4 Ultimately, it was civil litigation and not the FDA that
was responsible for the removal of Proplast jaw implants from the
market. Had lawsuits against Vitek begun in 1993, after Cipollone
and before Medtronic, it seems likely that holdings of MDA
preemption through section 360k would have sheltered Vitek in
many jurisdictions. This would have allowed Vitek to continue

133. See Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67
(1995).
134. See Judy Foreman, Danger Cited in Teflon Jaw Implants, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5,

1992, at 11.
135.

See id.

136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. At a congressional hearing on June 4, 1992, Dr. Daniel Laskin, editor of the

Journal of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, testified that as early as 1986, doctors were aware
of patients suffering tissue inflammation, bone decay, "intense pain," and "jaw dysfunction"
from the implants. See id.

139. See Foreman, supra note 134, at 11.
140. See id.
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marketing the Proplast jaw implants until the FDA intervened at
some unknown time in the future.
d. Pedicle screws.-The presently on-going product liability
suits involving pedicle screws provide a final example demonstrating the critical role that civil litigation plays as a means of
promoting the safe design, manufacture, and labeling of medical
devices. Pedicle screws are bone screws that are used in spinal
fusion operations."' The screws are implanted between narrow
archways in the spine called pedicles and serve as foundations for
attaching metal plates to the patients' vertebrae. 142 In 1986, the
FDA approved the use of bone screws in long bones like arms and
legs through the section 510(k) procedure, but twice refused, in
1984 and 1985, to approve their use in spinal fusion operations
because of the screws' close proximity to the spinal canal and nerve
3
14

roots.

Notwithstanding the FDA's refusals to authorize spinal use,
manufacturers began to promote the screws for general use in the
spine. 1"4 At present, three thousand plaintiffs are suing pedicle
screw manufacturers for injuries ranging from intense chronic pain
and numbness in the legs to4 sexual dysfunction caused by the
1
screws shifting and breaking.
Manufacturers suggest that the FDA's section 510(k) approval
of arm and leg uses for the screws was a tacit approval of "offlabel" use of the screws in spine operations.1"
According to
William W. Vodra, the FDA's associate chief counsel for drugs
from 1974 to 1979, off-label use by doctors is "extraordinarily
common."' 147 Vodra further claims that the "FDA generally does
not try to regulate [off-label use] unless it poses a major public
health problem."'"

141. See Claudia MacLachlan, Bone Screw Suit Places FDA in a 4-way Squeeze: Agency's
Limited Approval of Medical Device Lets Makers Sell for Wider Uses, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8,
1996, at Al.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Brief Amici Curiae of American Association of Retired Persons at 26,
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886).
145. See MacLachlan, supra note 141, at Al.
146. See id. As explained by MacLachan, "[olff label use refers to the practice of using
a product approved for one application in another." Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Apparently, the FDA agrees with the assertions of the pedicle
screw manufacturers that the FDA had given its tacit approval of
the use of pedicle screws. The FDA has proposed to reclassify
pedicle screws from Class III devices to Class II devices and has
also granted clearance for the marketing of some pedicle screws for
use in spinal fusion operations.14 9 This proposed change in the
FDA's treatment of pedicle screws has been fraught with allegations that manufacturers falsified data and marketed the screws for
use prior to any animal or human testing; that surgeons promoted
the use of pedicle screws while receiving stock options from screw
manufacturers; and that the FDA relied on studies authored by
some of these same surgeons. 5 ° Additionally, at the advice of
legal counsel, a number of the documents associated with the
FDA's latest pedicle screw clinical study were destroyed by the
research institution compiling the clinical data for the study.151
In spite of the disturbing allegations presented in the legal
action against the manufacturers of the screws, the federal district
court hearing the case has determined that all claims, with the
exception of express warranty and unlawful promotion claims, were
preempted by section 360k of the MDA.15 2
B. Impact on the Medical Devices Industry
Despite the apparent inadequacy of the FDA's efforts to
regulate the medical devices industry using the MDA, device
manufacturers suggest that allowing victims to recover under state
tort claims unduly stifles the development and marketing of
medical devices. Accordingly, the argument follows, when civil
suits are not preempted, manufacturers opt against spending time
and resources developing new medical devices due to fear of civil
liability. 53

149. See id.
150. See MacLachlan, supra note 141, at Al.
151. See Brief Amici Curiae of American Association of Retired Persons at 26-27,
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886).
152. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL1014, 1996 WL 221784,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 1996). The court's holding on the matter was made with prejudice,
recognizing that Medtronic was presently being reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court. See id. at *7.
153. See, e.g., Health Care Liability Reform and Quality Assurance Act of 1995: Hearings
on S. 454 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 38 (1995)
(statement of Thomas Scully, President and CEO of the Federation of American Health
Systems); Entrepreneurshipin America; Loosening the GovernmentNoose on Small Business,

1998]

THE POWER OF PREEMPTION

While product liability suits impose significant costs on medical
device manufacturers, according to some sources, these costs are
often overstated by manufacturers for purposes of retaining
immunity from products liability actions. For instance, one recent
study claims that in 1993 product liability costs represented a mere
19.9€ per one hundred dollars of retail sales. 5 4 Another recent
study conducted jointly by The Risk and Insurance Management
Society and Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, surveying 729 large companies, showed that in 1994 the total "cost of risk," including the
companies' costs in buying insurance and paying for uninsured
losses resulting from accidents, natural disasters, crime, and
lawsuits, was $7.30 per one thousand dollars of revenue. 55
Further, the fact that medical device manufacturers have profited
from a degree of immunity in recent years does not mean that such
immunity was ever intended by Congress or should be permitted to
continue.
One particular area of concern expressed by medical device
manufacturers relates to biomaterials suppliers withdrawing
particular biomaterials from the medical device market due to
liability exposure concerns. 5 6 Polyester, silicone, Teflon, and
polyurethane are all examples of biomaterials whose manufacturers
have limited or ceased production due to concerns regarding
litigation. It is notable, however, that most courts considering the
issue of bulk supplier liability to device recipients have held
suppliers liable only where the suppliers were aware of how the
materials buyers intended to use the products and knew the risks
1 57
associated with the intended uses.

Field HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Small Business, 104th Cong. 111 (1995) (statement
of E.R. Pickard, Chairman and CEO, Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.); Product Liability:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on
Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong. 115 (1992) (statement of Dane Miller, Ph.D.,
President and CEO of Biomet, Inc.).
154. See The Cost of Liability Insurance to American Business: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, 104th Cong. (1995), available in 1995
WL 253269 (testimony of J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance Consumer Federation of
America).
155. Ellen E. Schultz, Large Employers Are Carrying Lighter Loads of Liability Costs,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1995, at B5.
156. See James S. Benson, Biomaterials,MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUS., Apr. 1995,
at 34.
157. See Frederick D. Baker, Effects of Products Liability on Bulk Suppliers of Biomaterials, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 455 (1995).
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C. Effects on Providers
Presumably, the decision in Medtronic should provide a degree
of relief to medical services providers. In jurisdictions that prior to
Medtronic, favored the preemption of product liability claims
against manufacturers, plaintiffs often looked to hospitals and
physicians for damages. Allowance of such claims to be brought
against device manufacturers will likely cause plaintiffs to focus on
deeper-pocketed manufacturers to satisfy their claims. At a
minimum, providers will not be the only contributors compensating
victims of defective or deficient medical devices.
D. Proposed FDA Creation and Enforcement of Detailed
Regulationsfor Specific Devices
Perhaps the most workable solution for device manufacturers
following Medtronic would be for the FDA to create and enforce
detailed regulations for as many specific devices as would be
feasible.158
Such regulations would be beneficial for device
manufacturers because they would give device manufacturers a
standard on which they could reasonably rely throughout the
United States. Manufacturers would not be compelled to predict
how each court would interpret the term "specific counter-part
regulations" and then tailor their products to the lowest common
denominator for liability purposes. Instead, manufacturers could
accurately predict at the research and development stage whether
or not a specific product would be too costly to justify further
research or production.
State and federal courts would also benefit from explicit FDA
regulations specific to particular devices because such regulations
would lessen the number of cases in which courts would need to
make judgments in gray areas regarding which tort claims constitute "specific counter-part regulations." The benefits of specific
regulations would also enable plaintiffs to rely on the regulations
to provide the components of their claims. Finally, the creation of
specific regulations would be an important step in fulfilling the
original intent of Congress in enacting the MDA.159

158. On November 22, 1993, the FDA proposed to stiffen the design standards for
medical devices. See 56 Fed. Reg. 61,952 (1993); see also FDA Seeks to Stiffen Rule on
Medical Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at 28.
159. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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Of course, Congress would have to be willing to provide the
FDA with additional funding for both the creation of devicespecific regulations and more rigorous premarket testing. However,
if the original purpose of the MDA in providing safe and effective
medical devices is still a congressional priority, funding should be
granted.
VII. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
provides a critical step in turning away from the dangerous course
chosen by many courts following Cipollone using the MDA, a set
of amendments created to enhance the safety and effectiveness of
medical devices, as a means of sheltering medical device manufacturers from liability. While the Medtronic Court is somewhat
obscure regarding which claims actually constitute "specific counterpart regulations" sufficient to trigger MDA preemption, the Court
does provide that claims against section 510(k)-approved devices
and claims alleging violation of FDA regulations are not preempted. Additionally, Medtronic leaves the door open for the FDA to
create additional specific requirements for medical devices and
thereby provide the means by which the MDA could better achieve
their intended purpose of providing consumers with safe, effective
medical devices.
Kenneth J. Witzel

